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COMMENT: Punjab and the Taliban
Chaudhry Fawad Hussain
The Taliban philosophy is based on the strict
Deobandi school of Islam, which has no room for saints and shrines.
The majority of Punjabi Muslims are followers of the Barelvi school;
which revolves around the saint and his shrine
The New York Times reports that Taliban insurgents are teaming up
with local militant groups to make inroads in Punjab, and that in at
least five towns in southern and western Punjab, including Multan,
barber shops, music centres and internet cafes offensive to the
militants’ strict interpretation of Islam have received threats.
The report has instigated a blistering debate here in Punjab on
whether, in the days to come, the Taliban can really take over
Pakistan’s largest province. Some recent incidents, including
attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore and the Manawan
Police Training School, raised fears to new heights and many believe
that the Taliban, known to have their roots in the tribal culture of
frontier region and Afghanistan, have the capacity to expand their
control to other parts of Pakistan, most importantly to Punjab.
The Taliban school of thought simply cannot win support in Punjab. I
rest my opinion on three fundamentals because of which the Taliban
cannot win in Punjab.
First, the Taliban philosophy is based on the strict Deobandi school
of Islam, which has no room for saints and shrines. The majority of
Punjabi Muslims are followers of the Barelvi school; which revolves
around the saint and his shrine. Punjabi Muslims have always been
emotionality attached with shrines and sufis. When the Taliban
locked the mausoleum of Pir Baba in Buner, Punjabi Muslims felt
offended, despite the fact that Pir Baba is not a well-known saintly
figure in Punjab.
No one can dare think of closing down the shrines of Data Ganj
Bakhsh, Hazrat Mian Mir or Bahauddin Zakaria. Almost every village
in Punjab has a shrine, and for Barelvis, shrines are nearly as
sacred as mosques. This is not in conformity with the orthodox Ahle
Hadith or Deobandi traditions, which do not recognise the shrine or
mazar as a religious symbol. In fact, they consider reverence of
shrines as apostasy (shirk).
Second, there is no doubt that Punjabi rural society is caste-based
and people care for castes in inter se relationships. However, by no
means does this make it a tribal society. The customs even in remote
Punjabi villages are far more liberal than tribal customs. The
position of women in this society is more elevated than in tribal
society; they enjoy more liberties, and in many cases are the sole
decision makers.
In an agricultural economy like Punjab, women are as important as
men. In rural Punjab, women working in the fields is a common sight;
subjecting them to strict veil and domestic confinement as is the
case in the tribal areas of Afghanistan is unimaginable in Punjab.
In urban centres like Lahore, Multan, Rawalpindi and Faisalabad,
women are enjoying an even higher status than in the rural areas.
Therefore, it will not be possible for anyone to subject women in
Punjab to the kind of restrictions that the Taliban have imposed in
the areas under their control. The same applies for harsh
punishments: the death penalty was abolished in the area between
Delhi and Lahore much before its abolition in the United Kingdom.
The reaction to public hanging during the Zia era was so severe that
the government was forced to review its policy after only one
execution.
The third reason is the strong emphasis in the Punjabi lower and
middle class on education. Even families with income levels as low
as Rs 4000 to Rs 6000 per month take pains to send their children,
including females, to school. Hence, this very strong societal force
will deeply resist any ideology that restricts people from educating
their children. Further, proliferation of the free media and a
strong cultural base are two other factors that will make it
extremely difficult for the Taliban to establish themselves in
Punjab.
One of the arguments made by several commentators in Pakistan and
abroad is that the Taliban are a modern Robin Hood-type organisation
that appeals to the masses. Some have used class analysis to support
this view, arguing that the Taliban are essentially sparking a
‘revolution’. However, history tells us that it is not enough to
just be poor for someone to join a revolution; many more factors are
at play. Often, political and religious philosophies take precedence
over class identity; which is the case in Punjab. The Taliban
movement does not appeal to the people of Punjab because of the
reasons outlined above and will therefore find it extremely
difficult to achieve any success in the province.
The author is a Lahore-based lawyer and
columnist and can be reached at fawadch@hotmail.com
Daily Times:
Friday, May 08, 2009
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